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Introduction 
In my previous essay on debates surrounding the theme of continuity 
and change in Indian historiography on the eighteenth-century trans-
ition to colonialism – that appeared in an earlier volume of this journal 
– we closely followed the recent interventions made in the field of the 
ideological premises of colonial rule and the ways they influenced (or 
not) the administrative functioning of the (East India) Company state 
(Sinha 2012: 416-40). This essay, which is of the nature of critical 
engagement with another set of recent writings, takes up two im-
portant themes related to this field. First, it looks at British opinion 
(largely about themselves) and, second, at violence. It does so 
through the lens of white community in British India. Both themes are 
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crucial for understanding the processes of colonial state-formation and 
the ways in which the fissures that often laid within the moral, material 
and cultural world of the ‘whites’ in India were cemented, or at least, 
tried to be. 
Both themes are explored through a close analysis of two recent 
monographs – Joseph Sramek’s Gender, Morality, and Race (Sramek 
2011) and Elizabeth Kolsky's Colonial Justice in British India (Kolsky 
2010) – dealing with opinion and violence respectively. In the last few 
years some other seminal contributions have come out that posit a 
fundamental question to the nature of colonial power when seen 
through the prism of its heterogeneous white community. Therefore, 
the essay starts with a historiographical engagement with the theme, 
the scope and strengths of these new works, and their limitations. 
The invocation of the phrase ‘continuity and change’ in academic 
writing on the colonial period of Indian history is instantly taken to 
mean one of the following: either the continuity of ideologies, insti-
tutions and practices from the immediate pre-colonial period into the 
colonial or to the continuity of the latter albeit almost two hundred 
years later with the handing off of the baton of rule from colonial to 
national governments of India and Pakistan in 1947. In both cases, the 
framework of continuity and change is used to explore what happened 
in the temporal zones of ‘transition’, first in the 1760s from the ‘native’ 
to the British, and second in the 1940s, from the British back to the 
natives. Seen in this way, this very framework is reduced to juxta-
posing the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised.  
Most of the works that promise to revisit the historiography of early 
colonial rule, especially of administrative ideologies and governance 
tread along a few highly interesting but conventional themes. The 
period of Warren Hastings’ administrative experiments, the 1770 
famine, revenue systems, trade monopolies and its abuses, the ‘new 
constitution’ of Cornwallis, the Permanent Settlement, and Sati are 
some of the usual suspects. For long, economic and cultural accounts 
of British colonialism in India around these themes are organised along 
the juxtaposition between the coloniser and the colonised.  
A long glance at some of the major debates around the themes of 
imperialism, nationalism and later on subalternism (between 1960s 
and 80s), however, rather oddly suggests that under different 
ideological strokes, the category of the colonised was often dis-
aggregated in historiography to make sense of the colonial history. 
Indian ‘compradors and collaborators’ of the ‘Cambridge school’ did not 
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go down too well with the Marxist modes of history writing (not to 
mention the Marxist-nationalist umbrage) but the latter had their own 
dogmatic category of either the class or the undifferentiated nation. 
The new radical wave of subalternism re-arranged the chessboard of 
colonised Indian society into privileged elites and dispossessed sub-
alterns, quite literally into blocks or ‘domains’. 
Much of this disaggregation, however, should not be confused with 
the questioning of the juxtaposition itself; this started happening in-
creasingly from mid-nineties onwards. A rather ‘perverse’ outcome of 
the Saidian framework of literary analysis for Indian colonial history 
was the realisation of the instability of social and racial identities.1 This 
meant that the fixity of racialised premises of the identities of the 
coloniser and colonised came under scanner (Ann Laura Stoler’s 1989 
essay can now be regarded as ground-shifting, cf. Stoler 1989). 
Subsequently, the edited volume of Ann Stoler and Fredrick Cooper, 
Tensions of Empire (Stoler & Cooper 1997) attained a canonical status. 
Homi Bhabha’s essay on mimicry included in this collection but in-
dependently appearing before that can also be seen as a catalyst 
(Bhabha 1994). Stoler’s profound impact through her various writings 
are generously acknowledged by authors of two recent monographs on 
whiteness and poor whites, Harald Fischer-Tiné, “Low and Licentious” 
(Fischer-Tiné 2009: 12-3) and Satoshi Mizutani, The Meaning of White 
(Mizutani 2011: 3-7). 
With great merit, the exploration of tension and anxiety within the 
asymmetrical power relationship between the coloniser and the 
colonised was suggested to be done by treating the metropole and the 
colony as part of the “single analytic field” (Stoler & Cooper 1997: 4). 
This new approach manifested itself in production of rich and textured 
accounts of colonial encounters that redefined the study of imperialism 
and colonialism and laid grounds for the emergence of, what we may 
now call, a sub-discipline of ‘new imperial history’. Cultural and literary 
studies dominated over economic. The unstable identities of the co-
loniser and the colonised were studied in great detail through literary 
productions of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Studies 
based on travel literature are of special significance here. Two highly 
influential works on this theme are Mary Louise Pratt (1992) Imperial 
Eyes and Nigel Leask (1992) British Romantic Writers and the East. In 
the field of Indian colonial literary analysis, an opaque but influential 
writing from this period is Sara Suleri’s (1992) The Rhetoric of English 
India. 
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As it appears to the present reviewer, this framework was then 
subsequently deployed in unravelling the more immediate colonial 
situation in India, wherein anxiety informed the relationship between 
the coloniser and the colonised even in the quotidian practices of 
administration. Jon Wilson’s Domination by Strangers is a recent 
example of this in which anxiety plays an important role in fostering an 
indifferent attitude in colonial rulers (Wilson 2008). Anxiety both 
emotively and institutionally structured relationships: one, at the inter-
racial relationship between Europeans or – to be more precise – British 
and the natives, and two, the intra-racial relationship, that is, within 
the white British society in India. Anxiety pervaded both normative 
moral and administrative attributes of colonial governance. Amongst 
others, money, women, racial prestige, class and domesticity were 
some of the aspects that created a lot of anxiety amongst Britons and 
between them and natives, and our historiography has just begun to 
move into exploring the contours of some of them. (cf. Ghosh 2006; 
Peter Robb’s three recent monographs using the diaries of Richard 
Blechynden is a great addition to this strand of research on early 
colonialism). It is important here to flag up the point that the focus on 
anxiety does not mean the absence of brutality or violence; on 
contrary, most of the works covered in this essay point to the presence 
of overt violence. 
By making the boundary between the metropolis and the colony 
unmarked, moving and shifting, one great success this scholarship has 
achieved is in raising a fundamental question on the motive of co-
lonialism. To borrow words from a reviewer of the Stoler and Cooper 
volume, the approach made “unclear who the target populations of 
colonialism were” (Genova 1999: 154). This may seem overdrawn 
considering Said’s forceful words that structures of anxiety and sus-
picion and narcissism do not take away the fundamental point that 
whiteness commands a kind of default power in the global South (Said 
1998: 84). However, the implication of this framework that paralleled 
similar revisions in the questioning of other binaries, most importantly 
of the centre and periphery wherein the uni-linear transfer or diffusion 
of technology or ideology from the metropolis to the colony was se-
verely challenged, was manifold. The colonial hegemony was built 
upon (subordinated) native agency; the different sites and institutions 
of administration and rule such as police, courts, army, hospitals, 
communication, law and not least science were locations where 
different ideas and practices came into a dialogue. Dialogues do not 
mean dilution of power – in many instances, they are sites and 
 REVIEW ESSAY/FORSCHUNGSBERICHT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
326 
facilitators through which both power is consolidated and resisted at 
the same time.2 
After more than two decades now, the idea that the coloniser and 
the colonised don’t remain frozen in time, that their boundaries spill 
over on to each other, and that their perceived spatial ‘habitus’ (the 
metropole and the colony respectively) are not tied in uni-directional 
ways, appears old and exhausted. One must, however, remember that 
in the South Asian case when Suleri presented a powerful critique of 
the established binaries under the impulse of the literary turn and 
colonial discourse analysis, she also laid bare a potential to prise open 
the category of the coloniser itself. As Vinay Lal pointed out, “debates 
purportedly about colonialism, about ‘us’ and ‘them’ were often 
masking other concerns” (Lal 1995: 255). One of these concerns was 
related to moral and economic conduct of the whites in the colony as 
tied to the process of imperial class formation within the whites. On 
Suleri’s insistence on showing Edmund Burke as complicit as Warren 
Hastings in making India an object of colonisation, Lal rightly remarks 
that  
Burke was evidently more concerned, for example, about the 
effect of the ill-begotten riches of Hastings and other nabobs on 
English politics, the diminishing influence of the aristocracy, and 
the consequences of the entry of plebeians into the political life of 
England than he was about the political future or cultural life of 
India. (ibid.: 255) 
 
The basic idea here is to underscore the point that the politics of 
colonialism and imperialism had multiple constituents to address, and 
that the colonial society of whites was not a monolithic or a homo-
genous entity (Arnold 1979; cf. Arnold 1979a).  It remained divided 
along the lines of profession (civil and military), rank (covenanted and 
non-covenanted), prestige and occupation (public and private/official 
and non-official), class (gentlemanly and ‘low and licentious’), gender 
(memsahibs and ‘barrack wives’/European prostitutes) and location 
(presidency and mofussil). Whiteness and Europeaness were con-
structed and performed through the politics of race, class, gender, law 
and domicile. They were therefore also open to challenges and frac-
tures. The discourse of civilising mission built upon the white man’s 
burden towards the natives therefore had, what Fischer-Tiné has 
called, an internal logic, too. This internal civilising mission was 
directed towards “the unruly, highly mobile and often violent ‘white 
subalterns’” (Fischer-Tiné 2009: 261). 
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Whiteness came to be threatened from many angles – from the 
‘white subalterns’ association to crime to that of their domiciled status, 
from their practising overt violence to the creation of ‘mixed race’ 
(known as Eurasians and later as Anglo-Indians). Mizutani sums it up 
eloquently: “Such complex interlays of racist and class-chauvinist 
worldviews – both of which were simultaneously gendered – were at 
the very heart of the colonial construction of whiteness” (Mizutani 
2011: 4-5). On the specific point of domiciliary – although it is 
important to underscore how the domicile status between metropolis 
and colony constituted the grammar of difference amongst whites 
along the imperial setting, which Mizutani has beautifully and con-
vincingly explored – it is important to recognise how within the colonial 
space itself the spatial dichotomy between the presidency towns and 
mofussil stations shaped the attitudes of one white against the other. 
Many writers and officials residing in India in the nineteenth century 
reflected on this. In a series of letters written to his wife in the 1840s, 
Frederick Augustus Barnard Glover of the Bengal civil establishment, 
ridiculed the European lifestyle of Calcutta in which, he alleged, the 
gentlemen talk ‘shop’ and the ladies ‘scandal’. Referring to the ditch 
that was made to save Calcutta from Maratha raids, which sub-
sequently became the de jure boundary between English establishment 
and native habitations, he called Calcuttians ‘Ditchers’ (Sen 2006: 545, 
seemingly the term was widely in use before Glover penned his 
letters). Glover’s purpose in using this term was to make clear that he 
preferred mofussil life over European community in Calcutta. Rounding 
off his views on Calcutta, he said,  
I have now I think said all I can about Calcutta – I wish I could 
speak some in its praise – but I have no other feeling for it than 
that of Supreme disgust – and it must be a fat appointment 
indeed which will induce me to venture again amongst the 
Ditchers. (Glover: Mss Eur B 371, f 1-3) 
Another observer described the social life of British community as 
‘melancholy gabble’ in which “the rich look proud, dull and super-
cilious; the poor meek, dejected and obsequious” (“The Contrast; or, 
Opinions on India”: 538). The examples could be multiplied. Mofussil 
indeed was the place which was described as an interior and an exile, 
and hence the sojourning British strangers were received by the 
stationed families as intimate friends but chances of bonding with 
friends back from home and organising an ‘Eton dinner’ or a 
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Haileybury chummery symbolised a class- and rank-defined sociability. 
(Very interesting anecdotes and insights on British community peppers 
the details given in Life in the Mofussil 1878). 
Whiteness was a political issue, not just a cultural one, since the 
beginning of the colonial rule in India. The extent to which diverse 
groups of the white community (officials, planters, missionaries and so 
on) had the freedom to own land, labour and other resources, the 
freedom to freely preach the dissenting religion, and the freedom of 
press were widely discussed in the high-politics of British colonialism 
and imperialism. Some of them were disaffected and this disaffection 
was part of the political process of control the Company tried to 
establish over them (Marshall 1990). Planters (both of indigo and tea) 
were notoriously famous for their use of violence. They might not have 
been seen by British officialdom as men of gentlemanly propensities 
but since they were men of enterprise and capital, they were both 
patronised and disciplined by the state actors.  
In contrast, the perceived role of poor whites – soldiers, sailors, 
pensioners, loafers, convicts, prostitutes and other such groups – and 
of domiciled Europeans and Eurasians (mixed-race) in demeaning the 
native respect which the colonial rule in its self-assessment constantly 
needed to maintain, was equally significant in this period. There was a 
progressive increase in number of this class (poor whites, domiciled, 
Eurasians and the white working class) from the early to late colonial 
period (as shown by various authors including Arnold, Fischer-Tiné and 
Mizutani) but as far as the attitude towards them was concerned, 
David Arnold has aptly summed it up: “The administration’s animus 
towards any threatened ‘influx’ of poor whites remained as strong 
under the Crown [post-1857] as it had under the Company” (Arnold 
1983: 148). 
The Hastings impeachment attained the status of ‘imperial scandal’ 
and its fallouts on state-formation under the governorship of 
Cornwallis and Wellesley is a fairly well-known story; the many 
differences that existed within the white colonialists of the British 
empire nonetheless is a theme that was only marginally explored 
earlier and which has only very recently made a return into South 
Asian historiography. Some of the earlier writings, notably of Kenneth 
Ballhatchet, Peter Marshall and David Arnold, were seminal and 
continue to be so (Ballhatchet 1980; Marshall 1990, 1997; Arnold 
1979, 1983). In particular, their writings on imperial attitudes, nature 
of British society, white colonisation, urban differentiation, and the 
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intersecting role of race, sex and class, which appeared at a time when 
most of their contemporaries were heavily invested in exploring the 
extent of native collaboration and mercantile networks that sustained 
colonial political economy, are laudable. They can be seen as fore-
runners to many of the themes picked up by a host of current scholars 
whose works are dealt with in this review. For instance, Ballhatchet’s 
engagement with the colonial state’s policies on sexual excesses of and 
control over lower class military men or of white prostitutes threat-
ening the moral boundary of white racial superiority, or Arnold’s focus 
on paupers, vagrants and poor whites are exactly the themes 
(amongst others) covered by Fischer-Tiné, of course, in much greater 
detail (Fischer-Tiné 2009). 
Incidentally, some of the themes that needed better exploration 
unfortunately remain only sketchily presented in this set of new 
accounts. Most prominently, a dense history of poor whites in the early 
colonial period (1760s-1850s) is still missing in spite of Arnold’s 
comment that appeared more than thirty years ago, which suggested 
that the colonial rule’s attitude towards these poor whites hardened at 
the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
(Arnold 1983: 140; cf. Arnold 1979, for extensive discussion on early 
colonial period but mostly on orphanages. When it came to soldiers 
and vagrants, Arnold too concentrated on the second half of the 
nineteenth century).  
This temporal approach partly makes sense for certain groups such 
as soldiers because the Company administrators both in India and in 
England were of the view that those discharged from the duty should 
be sent back home. The hold of the Company in tightly regulating the 
presence of private Europeans with chances of some of them becoming 
vagrants started weakening from the 1830s. The institutional and legal 
mechanisms to deal with poor whites – the setting up of workhouses, 
penitentiaries, vagrancy acts – all came about from the mid-nineteenth 
century. Apart from demographic shift, Fischer-Tiné also identifies an 
ideological shift post-1857. This was in the nature of white colonialists 
turning from ‘nabob’ to ‘pucca sahib’ that marked a growing distance 
between the coloniser and the colonised, and effectively, also within 
colonisers (whites) (Fischer-Tiné 2009: 139-41).3 Mizutani’s reasoning 
is not very different; he too regards 1857 as the turning point in the 
course of imperial prestige that hardened along racial and class lines.4 
Yet, we need to ask, does this mean that the poor white question 
was marginal in the earlier period? I suppose none of these authors 
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would claim so but their work is patchily silent on this. Does a 
numerical shift justify historical (in)attention? From the accounts we 
have currently at hand, it seems unjustified. The racial genesis of 
policies for organising relief for European/Eurasian and Indian des-
titute, for instance, was well marked in the early colonial period 
(Arnold 2008: 120-1). Kolsky’s moving account of violence and 
tyranny perpetrated by unruly non-officials which not only comprised 
of ‘brutal planters’ but also of “European thieves, vagrants, and vaga-
bonds [who] were a steady presence in early colonial Bengal, both in 
the port town of Calcutta and upcountry” reminds that in spite of 
numerical shift whiteness and its multi-sited construction was at the 
heart of the early colonial state-formation (Kolsky 2010: 52, 27-68).  
The contention that the transformation from ‘nabob’ to ‘pucca sahib’ 
happened in the wake of the 1857 event is misleading. Recent 
convincing accounts have shown that distancing between the ruler and 
the ruled as part of the “bureaucratisation of the administrative 
apparatus” happened much earlier, somewhere in the decades of the 
1780s and 90s (phrase taken from Fischer-Tiné 2009: 140; cf. Sinha 
2012). Even for soldiers, Fischer-Tiné’s own work suggests a 
considerable degree of contemporary administrative concern towards 
barrack life both in terms of violence and sexual practices (Arnold 
1979: 110; cf. Fischer-Tiné 2009: 246-54). It then comes as a surprise 
to read him apologetically justifying the focus of his book, which is 
largely on the post-Mutiny period and offering the research on early 
colonial period as a suggestion to future researchers (to be fair to him, 
he does sketchily incorporate cases and examples from the earlier 
period; a systematic exploration is nonetheless missing) (Fischer-Tiné 
2009: 376). 
Mizutani’s work is self-admittedly not as much on poor whites as it 
is on domiciled Europeans and Eurasians. This leads him to justify his 
focus on the post-1857 period. There is again a demographic value to 
this argument: the number of soldiers was on the rise; semi-skilled 
and skilled workers usually from working class families of northern 
England was a new feature, and the political nature of ‘Eurasian 
Question’ took shape in the second half of the nineteenth century 
(Mizutani 2011: 7, 18-9). However, the historiographical merit in 
focussing on the second half of the nineteenth century is less con-
vincing in his case. Numbers aside, the ‘whites going native’ 
phenomenon which characterised the early colonial period in terms of 
mixed-race domesticity that in the first instance led to the creation of 
Eurasian community is extremely crucial to the subsequent de-
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velopment of colonial attitude. By 1791, Sen contends, a whole set of 
measures were passed prohibiting the appointment of “miscegenated 
offspring” of Company servants to civil and military posts (Sen 2006: 
541). The anxiety and violence that marred such domesticities and 
public enterprises as explored by Ghosh and Kolsky respectively do 
demand some effort to bridge this conventional temporal divide 
created by the 1857 Rebellion (Ghosh 2004, 2006; cf. Kolsky 2010). 
Finally, the combined accounts of Fischer-Tiné and Mizutani (and 
earlier writings of Arnold) interestingly make it clear that ‘white 
subalternity’ or ‘poor whiteness’ was as much a construction arising 
out of the constant delineation of imperial class and race boundaries as 
it was a dynamic process based on inner mobility between groups 
comprising of domiciled Europeans, poor whites and Eurasians. An 
imaginary life-course of a low class soldier coming to India serves to 
show this. On his retirement or even before that, let’s assume, he 
joined the railways as a gunner or mechanic, and perhaps due to 
drunkenness got dismissed, became a destitute, convict or a loafer and 
hence a part of the pool of ‘poor white’. Alternatively, he could have 
got married hypothetically to a mixed-race girl, started a family, and 
his son, who would have remained domiciled in India, continued the 
generational profession of working on the same railways. (cf. Arnold 
1979: 118-9, for multiple trajectories of becoming destitute by mem-
bers of different professional groups within the category of poor 
whites).  
Seen through imaginary cases of both individual and generational 
life-cycles, the boundary between domiciled European and Eurasian 
was highly porous; it also shows that the passage between ‘domiciled 
European and Eurasians’ on the one hand and ‘white subalterns’ on the 
other was not fixed. This is also broadly Mizutani’s contention as well, 
that is, that pauperisation and marriages between the domiciled and 
Eurasians broke down the rigid brackets of identities. In spite of this 
porous flow, the question that arises here is: what were the legal, 
administrative and social bases of these identities and categories, and 
did they come into conflict with each other? Unlike poor whites, the 
domiciled and Eurasians were classified under the Act of 1870 as 
‘Natives of India’ (Mizutani 2011: 65). This is a legal category which 
distinguished them from poor whites in terms of not being subject to 
repatriation (ibid: 76). However, under the ‘Warrant of Precedence’ 
issued by the Simla government they were placed at the bottom of the 
European community (Mizutani 2011: 66, annoyingly he does not give 
the date). Did this create a conflict with their legal classification as 
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‘natives’? Further on, the Indian census of 1921 defined (not classified) 
the domiciled occupying a “peculiar position in the Indian social 
organisation” (Mizutani 2011: 68). The ‘domiciled’ also at times appear 
to be an enumerative category to make better sense of policies that 
the state implemented targeting them. This social ambiguity, flexibility 
and peculiarity (whichever way we characterise it) stands in conflict, if 
not contrast, to the fixed legal identity.  
The question of legal identity of Britons in late eighteenth century 
India was in itself, as Sen has called, vexatious (Sen 2006). Different 
nationalities and sub-nationalities of the British Empire made any clear 
demarcation difficult. Broadly, territoriality (born in the territory of the 
British Empire and owing allegiance to the King) and blood (descent) 
defined legal subjecthood. Sen is more interested in charting the hi-
story of the ‘natives’ – what happened to those who were at least 
living within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in Calcutta. 
However, a more pressing question requires an answer: where did the 
domiciles fall into this debate in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century? Were they treated as British subjects in the be-
ginning and subsequently accorded the legal status of ‘natives’ or they 
were legally ‘natives’ right from the beginning? The silence on the part 
of Mizutani leaves us with a big blank in our understanding. Mizutani’s 
work does not give this reviewer any idea of how the legal, 
administrative, enumerative and social bases of identity formation 
interacted with each other, and how they changed over time.  
There are, however, differences also between the older set of 
writings and recent accounts we have been dealing with. The foremost 
question is what kind of whites were/are generally talked about? Some 
of the earlier works, which Lal’s comments above are symptomatic of, 
showed how the figure of the ‘nabob’, a colonial official returning home 
with riches, created anxiety in the late eighteenth-century British 
society and politics. In the metropolitan setting, this became an issue 
of class – nabobs potentially threatening the aristocratic order of 
British society. In the imperial/colonial setting, this became a matter of 
administration; apart from Burke’s fine rhetoric on linking ideals of 
governance to ideals of mankind, for the majority of contemporary 
observers, the issue was quotidian rather than philosophical. It related 
to the moral and material corruption which the Company was plagued 
with. Hence, the form of anxiety was administrative.  
In contrast, recent works, particularly those of Fischer-Tiné and 
Mizutani, show how the poor whites, beggars, loafers, convicts, 
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prostitutes, and Eurasians of the colony were at the centre of creating 
a moral crater within colonialism and imperialism that ideally was 
programmed to abide by the elite-made rules of race and class. Here, 
the extent of crises that the rule felt – morally and legally – was far 
more complex and widespread than the narrow confines of ad-
ministration. Poor whites and Eurasians were not just ‘administrative’ 
problems; they were in the heart of internally jeopardising the project 
of colonialism. 
The second point of departure for the new scholarship, therefore, 
rests in its potential to signal a change in the framework of analysis. In 
contradistinction to Ballhatchet’s work, which in the words of Thomas 
Metcalf provided “a fascinating glimpse of a world hardly known” but 
lacked methodological novelty, the new scholarship of Fischer-Tiné, 
Mizutani and Kolsky theoretically binds the history of a motley of 
marginal white to the history of colonialism and imperialism in a much 
integral way (Metcalf 1982: 755, one can say that his prognosis that 
these marginal whites should be seen as central to the conception of 
colonial order has come true). The multi-sited construction of white-
ness (gender, class, race, law and domicile), the performance of that 
whiteness (through anxiety, distance-making and violence), and the 
constant moral, legal and administrative dilemma it created for the 
rule are now simply unavoidable if one wishes to understand the 
nature of colonialism in India and of imperialism in general.  
Third, although much in these accounts is still shrouded along the 
older lines of analysis that studied colonial policies (most strikingly in 
Mizutani’s work) there is, however, a glimpse of the social history of 
lower order of Europeans emerging in these works (most notably in 
Fischer-Tiné). Methodologically, these works are setting themselves 
apart from the overt grip of the postcolonial/postmodern turn, which in 
Fischer-Tiné’s words have “(unwillingly) contributed to the longevity of 
some imperial myths” (Fischer-Tiné 2009: 371, 182-5).  The South 
Asian history writing is reeling under the retreat of the social, and 
perhaps, these accounts in their modest ways can help conceptualise 
the social in newer ways (a dated but still valid piece is by 
Parthasarathi 2003). 
Empire of ‘opinion’ 
Turning to a detailed engagement with some of these works, I begin 
with Josef Sramek’s work for three reasons. First, it temporally fills the 
gap outlined above; the book focuses on the period between 1765 and 
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1858 and argues that a lot of changes assigned to the formation of the 
British Raj or the Crown period (post-1857) have antecedents in the 
Company period. Second, although the book does not deal with ‘poor 
whites’, the way it presents anxiety, prestige and opinion-making as 
centrally situated in the making of colonial rule is crucial for our 
purposes of understanding the general nature of the rule and its 
ambiguous disdain towards its own racially-same but class-wise 
different groups and individuals. Striking is the feature that it was not 
only ‘poor whites’ that became the source of anxiety and subsequent 
control but also the Company officials (both civil and military). The 
anxieties were of the moral imperial order. To quote Sramek: “[…] 
imperial officials also worried about Britons’ misbehaviour in India 
because it stood to bring into possible disrepute British colonialism’s 
very moral legitimacy as well as threaten Indian loyalty” (Sramek 
2011: 3). Third, in spite of colonialism being presented here as a 
system of governance and difference between the rulers and the ruled, 
the imperial moral dilemma and its attempted resolution does not let 
the work slip into the conventional account based on the coloniser-
colonised juxtaposition outlined above. 
The empire in India, Sramek contends, was an “empire of opinion”. 
Display of moral authority, racial prestige and honour were crucial, so 
much so that, according to the author, this created a rhetoric of which 
the British themselves became the victim. This claim is rather awk-
wardly left unexplained. In order to show that anxiety and arrogance 
were part of the same structure and ideology of rule, Sramek sets on 
to trace the “colonial beginnings” from 1600. Pushing the beginning of 
colonialism to that date may raise some eyebrows, but as far as the 
strategies that were adopted to regulate the zone of conduct are 
concerned, it is worth summarising his arguments (Sramek 2011: 18-
20). The Company had devised three ways: first, by informally letting 
its officials make profit in the country trade while retaining the 
monopoly over the more lucrative Asian-European trade; second, by 
introducing the covenant system in 1674 that bound the employees to 
protect the Company from any future loss; and third, and in the 
author’s view the most important, by continuing to rely on the Mughal 
polity thus constraining private British greed. 
This overview of the pre-1757 period provides some pre-history to 
the imperial moral dilemma; albeit not necessarily dealing with white 
paupers it goes a little further into providing a longue dureé per-
spective, something  Fischer-Tiné alludes to (cf. Fischer-Tiné 2009: 
376). Equally important is how a legal instrument – covenant – was 
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used to build a network of trust through which the “private greed” of 
the Company officials was thought to be regulated. It was therefore 
not just a matter between public/official and private/non-official; the 
moral dilemma that engulfed imperial rule dissected the individual into 
his public role and private greed, the latter requiring control and 
reform. The covenant system remained important throughout the nine-
teenth century even for hiring workers employed on the railways. The 
legal mechanisms that developed in the course of the nineteenth 
century should therefore be contextualised in this changing re-
lationship between law, trust and greed. Opinion making and prestige 
preservation remained important vis-á-vis natives and lower class 
Europeans. The self-isolatory sites of prestige preservation were 
housing, bungalows, clubs and hill stations; the alleged sources of 
degeneration were climate, miscegenation, schools, domestic ser-
vants, and alcohol. These were physical and material factors: the real 
issue at stake was “a blend of the imperialist politics of race and the 
bourgeois politics of class” (Mizutani 2011: 45, cf. 14-47). 
To return to the late eighteenth century, the story of financial irony, 
that is, the insolvency of the Company amidst some of its top officials 
getting richer, and the subsequent intervention of the British par-
liament is too well known to be recounted here. Sramek’s account, 
however, forces us to rethink the issues of trust and greed, a theme, 
which at the risk of sounding pedantic, needs closer attention from 
historians working on this period. The network of trust on the one 
hand and greed for profit on the other were not mutually opposed all 
through the seventeenth and much of the eighteenth century. One is 
left wishing to know more about the practices through which trust was 
ensured and enacted in this period and even later on. What role did 
whiteness play in building that trust – and which meaning of whiteness 
worked in which period? While we focus rightfully on aspects of law 
and other political institutions and structures to understand state-
formation, aspects such as greed, trust, and friendships are currently 
scarcely explored. An ‘enmeshed’ history of encounters, intrigues, 
jealousies, conspiracies, confrontations, negotiations and settlements, 
between different economic and political powers and individuals of the 
time could be one way of doing this.  
Unlike 1857, or even the 1820s, the decade of 1790s is now being 
seen as the point that sharply realigned the attitude of the colonial 
rulers. The administrative reforms under Cornwallis’ governorship, 
leading amongst others to measures of control for private greed and 
abuse on part of the Company officials were even privately approved 
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of in letters exchanged between friends. Francis Skelly, lieutenant-
general and later major of the 74th Highland Regiment, wrote from 
Calcutta to his friend in London in 1789: 
We know not here who will succeed Ld Cornwallis as Governor of 
India. I look towards the change with some uneasiness. I should 
be sorry to see his laboures [sic] destroyed by an unworthy 
successor – For, high as we now stand in the opinions of the 
Eastern powers, the command of a knave, a fool, or a madman 
would soon overthrow the lofty and glittering Edifice we have 
raised. (Skelly: part 4: 9, Mss Eur D 877)  
Whiteness demanded the control of greed. Even higher officials like 
Skelly were in debt either to creditors in London including tailors and 
shoemakers or to banias and shroffs in India. His letters, for instance, 
are peppered with money talk, savings, wishes to be promoted to fat 
jobs, and not returning home without eight to ten thousand pounds. 
The hope of becoming rich in the east rode on the back of older 
networks of trust; the reformist agenda seems to have had started 
questioning it though. To turn to Skelly once again, in a letter written 
to the same friend in 1792, he said: 
My uncle trusts much in Ld. Cornwallis’s power, and will, to save 
me – and seems to expect to hear soon of my being placed in 
some lucrative situation where a fortune may be acquired in a few 
years – but of such situations there are no more in India – nor 
can they, as formerly, be created – unless Lord Cornwallis should 
condescend to act contrary to the wholesome laws as established 
for the good of this country. (ibid.: 75) 
These details together with Sramek’s account add a layer to the 
meaning of whiteness explored by others. They show how the 
boundary of trust and dependence between the whites and natives and 
amongst whites was defined through regulative means which were 
precisely meant to make whiteness appear superior and fit for 
performing colonial rule. This superiority was based on cultivated and 
enforced social and economic distancing. In the 1760s and 1770s, the 
Company directors prohibited employees from lending or borrowing 
money to and from Indian princes (Sramek 2011: 21-2). The 
regulation of cultural and moral boundaries along the institution of 
credit that could possibly have had political spillover in terms of 
securing administrative influence is of great significance here. 
Recently, Bhavani Raman has beautifully brought this out in her study 
of scribal groups in the Madras presidency (Raman 2012: Ch. 1). She 
shows how the different arenas of culture, economy and politics were 
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tied to each other in the late eighteenth century, and how policing one 
of them meant regulating the other two. 
Apart from financial corruption in connivance with natives, drunken-
ness and illicit sexual behaviour were seen as important breaches in 
moral authority. This is where, according to Sramek, the moral 
prestige of whiteness demanded its racialised/colonised victim 
(Sramek 2011: 31). In the early twentieth century British seamen 
were said to have become the victims of the “Wily Oriental” (Fischer-
Tiné 2009: 280); more than a century ago, young English lads coming 
to India were thought of in the same way, that is, as being in danger 
of becoming victims of corrupt and depraved natives. As it often 
happens in history, things exactly don’t roll out the way the masters 
(of events or narratives) choose. Administrative reforms not-
withstanding, India continued to be seen as a place to make quick 
money. What does this popular imperial perception tell us about the 
“empire of opinion”? The workhouse system introduced for ‘white 
underdogs’ did not accomplish the results envisioned (Fischer-Tiné 
2009: 181); the educational programme in “European schools” did not 
prove effective in solving the “Eurasian Question” (Mizutani 2011: 
135). 
Similarly, the young recruits coming to India in the early nineteenth 
century did not give up treating the east as a source of making quick 
personal gains. Robert Grenville Wallace after spending some years in 
India in the early nineteenth century observed that young cadets 
arriving in India often lived in the state of luxury and intemperance. 
They suffered, he alleged, from “a rage of display” (Wallace 1824: 
367). The reason behind going to the colony to become rich, and that 
too quickly was not premised merely upon the idea of “native cor-
ruptibility”. It had a much broader imperial context depending upon 
the ties of family and regions where these young men came from and 
the way empire instilled aspirations for individual gains. It was a 
product of mercantile antecedents of the Company. If due to strange-
ness and loneliness the colony was seen as an exile it was also 
sometimes seen as an abode of happiness, pleasure and enrichment, 
even if only momentarily. Can we then posit a situation wherein 
opinions about empire were not only multiple but contradictory? 
The causal link between normative regulations of colonial and 
imperial morality and the everyday administrative practices were often 
tenuous. This is evident from Sramek’s admission of “a far messier 
reality of Company officials who continued to engage in pecuniary 
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relationships with their Indian subordinates, much as British nabobs 
had done fifty years earlier” (Sramek 2011: 42; a little later he once 
again admits that British officials did not often live up to the high 
expectations placed on them, 50; and finally on the mismatch between 
colonial reality and colonial rhetoric, 63). 
This fissure between intended outcomes of the policies and the 
actual reality is interesting for our discussion. Works on poor whites 
have argued that the elites of the white community created a 
hegemonic discourse of moral crises and adopted mechanisms to 
either make lower class Europeans conform to the values associated 
with whiteness or, if not possible, to simply hide them in workhouses 
and prisons (Fischer-Tiné 2009: 183). There is room for some 
resistance on the part of poor whites in Fischer’Tiné’s thesis but I 
would argue that a more modified picture emerges in Mizutani’s 
handling of the domiciled and Eurasians. In his work one sees how 
persistent the state and other stakeholders such as the missionaries 
were to include them into the mainstream through different schemes 
of training, agricultural resettlements, schools and charity, and 
emigration on a rather, if we may say so, positive than punitive level. 
Inclusion went hand in hand with exclusionary mechanisms (Mizutani 
2011: Ch. 2-5). On an abstracted level, the question arises how to 
integrate the other fissure, that of elites not conforming to moral/racial 
prestige, into our narratives of imperial opinion making and whiteness. 
In these works the ‘elite whites’ appear to be very homogenous and if 
‘moral deviance’ was the factor that defined whiteness then deviances 
of elites and subalterns need to be explored as part of the “single 
analytic field” (Stoler & Cooper 1997: 4; a recent attempt in this 
direction is Carrington 2013). 
In his diary, Hawkins Francis James, a Bengal civil servant from 
1827-55, struggled between many pulls and pushes; between just-
ifying his liking for his home and yet enjoying being a new man; his 
joy for pecuniary independence in the colony as well as acquiring 
means to help his family back at home. It would be a little harsh to 
narrow down this polyphony of emotions – from subjectivity to fortune 
making – just to matters of opinion and management because in an 
interesting yet intriguing way Sramek contends that by the 1810s-20s, 
the misbehaviour of the British official in India was not seen as 
indicative of any moral vacuum but was just a public image problem 
(Sramek 2011: 66). 
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Now, as the works of Arnold, Fischer-Tiné, Mizutani and Kolsky have 
shown, the moral dilemma remained a persistent problem all through 
colonial rule. We need to know then: did the earlier dilemma as-
sociated with both elites and subalterns of the whites now just get 
confined to the latter; or, parallel to natives being blamed for 
individual colonial excesses in the earlier period, was there a similar 
process of enforced and constructed social differentiation in the second 
half of the nineteenth century that, apart from demographic factors, 
made the issue of ‘low Europeans’ explosive? Carrington does suggest 
that there was often an attempt from senior ruling members to put the 
blame of white violence on the “lowest rung of European officialdom” 
(Carrington 2013: 815; 792-3, cf. Bailkin 2006: 487, Bailkin also 
makes such a claim in a more definite way). A similar trend also ex-
isted in the metropole where the elite violence was not perceived as a 
social problem (Bailkin 2006: 468).  
Different white working groups came to India. Apart from planters 
who often created moral and legal problems, sailors and railway engine 
drivers were also notorious for visiting prostitutes, drunkenness, 
violence, and pauperism. I believe that the question of morality was 
never reduced to the mere problem of image management; depending 
on how people related to it, of course, it changed its meanings. It is 
here that a dialogue needs to be created between scholars working on 
elite and subaltern whites to locate the changing meaning of whiteness 
in the changing nature of this interaction. Peter Robb’s view – that the 
misconduct by elites, either through degeneration or not, sharpened 
the construction of the identity of poor whites – is a valuable hint for a 
future line of inquiry (Robb 2013: 122).   
One final point, which serves as an entry point to the second part of 
this essay is the relationship between the moral virtuousness which the 
British claimed and strived to maintain and the physical violence they 
practised. The constant political intrigues and wars throughout the 
Indian subcontinent, in which the EIC directly participated between 
1757 and 1818 and again in the 1840s, need to be situated within the 
contemporary understanding of morality that the English claimed to 
possess and display. Sramek fails to provide a conceptual framework 
to understand how the British claim to superior morality and their 
violence worked together. Hastings’ line of defence during his im-
peachment, that a certain degree of arbitrariness was indispensable for 
ruling India, is a perfect example of the uncomfortable relationship 
between Edmund Burke’s idea of higher morality and the India-based 
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colonial officials’ desire or need to acquire what they understood as 
Indian practices (which included violence). 
Empire of violence 
Like Sramek, Elizabeth Kolsky’s book Justice in British India (Kolsky 
2010) is also on the relationship between the coloniser and the 
colonised but by choosing the theme of white violence she cuts open 
the uneasy relationship between whiteness and state institutions. The 
major arguments of her book are the following: first, everyday physical 
violence was an intrinsic feature of imperial rule; second, it was central 
to the working of the empire and the formation of the colonial state in 
India; and third, law was the most crucial force that legitimised this 
violence. In this regard, this book is as much about that part of the 
legal history of colonial India that dealt with violence and justice as 
about the brutal violence that marked the history of colonialism, a 
theme which surprisingly had not been systematically explored until 
Kolsky’s book arrived. The vivid re-telling of different case-histories of 
violence (from everyday beating to rape and murder), imprisonment 
and acquittal reminds us that violence and its institutional accomplices 
were part and parcel of colonial rule. Reading Kolsky one can 
appreciate that the centrality of the ‘image-making’ exercise that 
colonialism dovetailed into had a very material basis to it; this was the 
physical violence – aided by law and race – practised in the everyday 
life of colonialism, and the worry that this violence produced. 
It was precisely the intersection of display of whiteness and the 
violence committed in the public that made white violence a moral and 
administrative issue (Bailkin 2006: 470). It also adds to the point 
made above that it was not only poor whites that unnerved the 
empire; the violence perpetrated by non-poor whites (the non-officials 
or privates) equally posed itself “to the colonial authorities as serious 
sources of social and political unrest” (Mizutani 2011a: 206). In this 
sense, Kolsky’s work when read together with Fischer-Tiné and 
Mizutani offers us to see violence, and the moral dilemma it created for 
whiteness (as a performative discourse) and the administrative 
functioning of the state, as part of the “single analytic field” cutting 
across the poor and non-poor whites. 
In the other works discussed so far, the role of law appears in a 
very specific way; it appears as a part of institutional and regulative 
mechanisms that the colonial state devised to contain, control and hide 
poor whites. Fischer-Tiné’s lengthy discussion of Vagrancy Acts is a 
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case in point. The near absence of law in Mizutani’s account is 
disappointing (cf. Robb 2013: 123). Kolsky on the other hand reframes 
the legal culture of colonialism into one central analytical framework 
that then relates to different types of colonial encounters, either race 
or class based. Most importantly, violence does not appear to be an 
aberration but a quotidian practice. The history of the ways in which 
the containment of that violence worked is therefore integral to its not 
remaining an aberration, and hence a subversion of the rule of law by 
those very who claimed to establish it. There was a constant shift in 
the techniques of control over white violence: from a system of license 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to that of co-
dification in the middle and late decades of the nineteenth century. 
Sometimes the containment was willingly partial because of the nexus 
of law, race and capital, as Kolsky reasons to be the case in Assam tea 
plantations. The law was willingly reluctant to redress the violence 
committed over coolies’ bodies. 
Let us use her Assam example to reflect upon the relationship 
between exceptionality and universality of violence and law. There is 
no denying that at least rhetorically the colonial state upheld the 
universality of law. As Douglas M. Peers in his review of Kolsky’s book 
has pointed out, there was no tacit acceptance or approval of violence 
by the state. Kolsky’s own work shows how the state machinery was 
troubled by the consequences of violence (Peers 2011: 439). However, 
excessive white violence remained ubiquitous. The question arises how 
to address and understand this anomaly? In the case of Assam, she 
argues that the tea plantation economy based upon immigration and 
penal contract system rendered it exceptional (Kolsky 2010: 148-57). 
In her words, Assam was marginal, the fringe of the empire, “beyond 
the pale of justice” and not least “a frontier zone” (ibid.: 146). Yet the 
choice of this ‘exceptional’ place to study an ‘everyday’ phenomenon 
(white violence) is puzzling. In her defence, she argues that “the 
problem of white violence on tea plantations offers a vivid example of 
how violence simultaneously menaced and maintained the empire” 
(ibid.: 146–7). 
But if violence was a quotidian practice as forcefully argued in the 
beginning of the book (Kolsky 2010: 4, 10), then why present it 
through the logic (and at sites) of exceptionality and marginality? 
Penal contract system in its essence was not only practised on tea 
plantations. Throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth century a 
variety of labouring groups worked under the regulative mechanism 
that criminalised the ‘breach of contract’. By rendering Assam and its 
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political economy that promoted violence exceptional, Kolsky in my 
view has undermined her own thesis of the centrality of violence in 
colonial quotidian practices. Her argument can be turned around to 
contend that since the space was exceptional, the political economy of 
a particular commodity was exceptional, and therefore the applicability 
of the law also needed to be exceptional (hence, more power to plant-
ers to practice violence towards coolies). In fact, her exceptionality 
argument precisely reverberates with what the planters were 
demanding from the state – unrestrained freedom to control labour. 
On the face of it, Kolsky is doing something similar to what Fischer-
Tiné and Mizutani have done, namely, to show that the socially 
marginal whites within the colonial whites, who exposed the class bias 
of the white ruling elites, had all the potential to threaten the stability 
of the colonial rule. This threat was not only because of their des-
titute/poor/vagrant/convict/prostitute status, which would set a wrong 
example of whiteness in the eyes of natives, but also crucially because 
be they marginal, they were also prone to commit brutal violence on 
the natives. There are differences though. Kolsky’s planters can’t be 
put in the same bracket as poor whites. Also, as Bailkin has per-
ceptively pointed out, soldiers bore a distinctive relationship to 
officialdom and hence their bracketing with ‘non officials’ is highly 
problematic (Bailkin 2010: 910). 
However, the combined strength of these works is that both the 
presence and the actions (violence, vagrancy, begging, prostitution 
etc.) of these groups had direct fallout on the legal and ideological 
premises of the rule. Therefore, in Kolsky’s terms, they constituted the 
“third face of colonialism”, an “in-between” group (ibid.: 5), who “blur-
red the purportedly neat line dividing the colonizers and colonized” 
(ibid.: 4). Because of this in-between status they threatened imperial 
stability from within. 
Similar to our above discussion on exceptionality and universality, 
the present reviewer finds problem not in the argument about their in-
between status but in the way Kolsky tries to paddle two sets of 
arguments to present a steady account. However, as an aside it must 
be said that planters and violence-perpetrating soldiers appear more 
as ‘unruly colonisers/whites’ rather than as an ‘in-between group’. 
They are not like Mizutani’s domiciled Europeans or Eurasians who had 
a much more ambivalent position: legally they were natives of India 
but racially Europeans or of (mixed) European descent. They are also 
not even completely like Fischer-Tiné’s poor whites because planters 
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were seen as men of enterprise and capital and it was precisely of this 
nature that they became a powerful lobby to contest the ideological 
(and some would say rhetorical) equality embedded in colonial legal 
doctrines.  
However, to return to the issue of violence: if actions of the 
marginal whites, people on fringes, in-betweens, and so on were 
threatening the imperial stability then why should we recognise their 
acts as representative of imperial ideology as Kolsky asks us to do? 
Was imperial ideology consciously self-destructive? Or, is she en-
couraging us to think about imperial ideology as a forked tongue, as an 
intrinsic dual split that tried to stabilise and destabilise itself at the 
same time? Her proposition that violence menaced and maintained the 
empire at the same time suggests the latter. I feel there is some 
slippage here in conflating ‘imperial ideology’ with ‘colonial pre-
dicaments’. We can definitely ‘radicalise’ our notion of colonial state 
and ideology by arguing that the state had heterogeneous locations of 
power and multiple centres of resistance that did not often synchronise 
with each other; and the ideological premises of the state were also 
intrinsically fractured and contradictory. But this is apparently not what 
Kolsky is arguing.  
The way she is trying to reconcile exceptionality and universality 
with the fringe and the centre leaves us with certain questions. For 
instance, if the white violence was an inevitable accompaniment of the 
imperial form of power, and hence, by extension of colonial state-
formation, what is the relationship between the centrality of the 
workings of the empire that aided violence and the marginality of the 
social groups that perpetrated such violence (to repeat, she accords 
them the status of “social and physical fringes of the empire”)? Is it 
sufficient to say that violence from the margin propelled the law 
making machinery in the centre – and that, this is what connects 
centrality and marginality?  
Again, if violence was the quotidian practice of colonialism then why 
do we need to address it through an ‘in-between’ group or the third 
face of colonialism? After all, everyday violence in terms of flogging 
and beating was practised even by the elite official class both in public 
offices and their households. The punkah wallah is a legendary figure 
of colonial literary and administrative archives whose primary work 
seems to be receiving flying boots from the sahibs than swinging the 
punkah rope! A boot here and a kick there to these servants were 
prescribed if for nothing else than just as a strategy to remind them of 
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their place. There were servants kept to beat other servants 
(Carrington 2013: 785). The issue here is that violence itself was of 
different types, or at least for the sake of the argument, say, of two: 
ordinary and exceptional. Bailkin’s has raised a very pertinent set of 
questions on this issue which is worth repeating: 
In particular, one wonders about the relationship between the 
violence of the everyday and the state-sponsored forms of 
violence that were equally integral to colonial rule. What, 
precisely, was the connection (or disjunction) between ordinary 
and exceptional violence? Between the violence of the “wrong 
sort” of Europeans and the violence of the state itself? (Bailkin 
2010: 910) 
The above questions are framed around the categories of ‘exceptional’ 
and ‘ordinary’ with the implication that state-sponsored violence by 
default was exceptional. I imagine that the state’s nexus in the 
plantation violence is what Bailkin has in mind when she calls it 
exceptional. Carrington uses the phrases “institutionalised” and 
“random individual” violence (Carrington 2013: 793). We can 
heuristically make use of such categories but historically any rigid 
classification would prove unproductive because it can be easily shown, 
for instance, how the regulative mechanism of the state, whether in 
Europe, the USA, Latin-American states or in the colonial annexes of 
imperial powers, legitimised ‘everyday/ordinary’ violence. The core 
issue, therefore, is not to search for new categorisations but to realise 
that if we take ‘violence’ as the fundamental category of our analysis 
then we do need to disaggregate its varieties, delineate its typologies, 
and then account for different social, legal, and private ‘regimes’ in 
which they operated. In fact, ‘white violence’, that is, violence under-
stood as perpetrated by racially white people was itself a new category 
of the early twentieth century. The colonial archives before this period 
did not categorise violence according to race but according to offense 
(Bailkin 2006: 470).  
Kolsky’s incisive account on legal developments helps to get an idea 
of her line of reasoning. According to her, there were two faces of law 
and justice in colonial India: one, the idealist, universalist claim that 
everyone including natives and Britons were equal before the law; and 
second, a practical colonialism-inflected functioning of the law that 
granted privileges and exemptions to the whites. There is no point in 
losing steam over determining whether it was the law or the whiteness 
(racial sameness) that created what Fischer-Tiné has eloquently called 
“racial dividends”; the takeaway point is that class and race were 
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instrumentally structured by legal parameters (selective exemptions) 
under colonialism. These exemptions worked both for marginal groups 
and elites of the whites. White convicts got better treatment in 
comparison to natives (Fischer-Tiné 2009). 
The Ilbert Bill controversy of the late 1870s on the jurisdiction of 
Indian judges over British defendants on the other hand shows that a 
range of white classes – from civil servants to planters to that of 
memsahibs – were opposed to the enshrined racial equality in the bill. 
So, although one can critically appreciate Kolsky attempt in trying to 
balance the relationship between exceptionality and everyday and 
between marginal and central by exposing the two-faced working of 
the law, in my view she could have taken violence itself as the central 
category, exposing its multiple characteristics – racial, colonial, and 
social (the violence of non-whites elites on non-whites poor is marginal 
or absent in her work). The multiple sites and locations of the violence 
together with their ways of operating (for instance, from informal to 
institutional) would give us a picture of how at times whiteness had 
united itself by glossing over its intrinsic class and domiciliary di-
visions, and how at others it remained immanently contestatory. In 
adopting this approach, I feel, Assam would not have become 
externalised as it currently does in her account. The intriguing part is 
that Kolsky is aware that “in some ways whiteness was monolithic” 
(Kolsky 2010: 11). She further explains,  
 
Whiteness was certainly experienced as monolithic by colonial 
India’s beaten and battered coolies and punkhawallahs – what 
difference did it make to them that the white planter and soldier 
and magistrate were not of the same class? (Kolsky 2010: 11, cf. 
ibid.: 4, 10, 12, 16, 24, for other formulations suggesting the 
monolithicity of whiteness) 
 
This is an extremely valid point; violence does not need to be just 
accounted for through the systems of law and justice but also through 
how it was felt, perceived and resisted. But I wonder why Kolsky puts 
a contradictory disclaimer a page before, claiming that her book is not 
about “how Britons viewed their empire or how the empire was viewed 
by Indians” (Kolsky 2010: 10). Once again, her unexplained con-
tradictory remarks undermine the centrality of her own thesis.  
The nexus between whiteness and law in the field of state-formation 
comes out clearly in Kolsky’s account of the codification of law, first, 
through the Code of Criminal Procedure, and second, of the Indian 
Evidence Act (Kolsky 2010: Ch. 2-3), which makes it clear how the 
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idealist legal equality was defeated in the face of mounting pressure to 
secure privileges and exemptions.  
The creation of Indian medical jurisprudence, the use of cultural 
logic to understand dispositions, customs and prejudices of the people 
amongst whom investigation was to be pursued, and the medico-
ethnographic premises of the diseased and the weak Indian body, 
shows how white crime was not just a matter of pure moral and 
political concern but was part of the way the cultural and ethnic 
parameters were used to sanction legal exemptions. In other words, 
white crime laid bare the inherent tension between the universalism 
and particularism of colonial ideologies (cf. Robb 1995: 3-10, 30, 
pointing out this dichotomy in itself is no historiographical novelty). 
The universalistic aspirations remained defeated or at least 
compromised because race and racial affinity based on whiteness 
overcame all other considerations related to the ideas of equality, 
rank, class and so on. In other words, although law is the central 
category in Kolsky’s account to understand the failure of the uni-
versalist ideology of legal equality, in practice it was the simple 
historical factor of race and ‘racial dividends’ that divided the coloniser 
and the colonised. The binary of colonial difference was, therefore, 
reiterated due to white violence rather than being challenged by their 
in-between practitioners. It was this racial affinity that prevailed over 
the official wisdom in formulating legal equality and also perhaps over 
the capacity of the state to enforce it. The colonial state monopolised 
(or wished to do so) the use of violence, as all modern states do, and 
hence the subsequent history of white violence was the history of a 
nebulous tension between the state’s authority and racial affinity. 
Also, so far the historiographical implication of the argument related 
to double-faced nature of law is concerned, there remains some 
obscurity. Colonial law, according to Kolsky, shielded or protected 
white violence but also failed to curtail it. In other words, there was 
the regime of lawlessness as well as the complicity of the law. On the 
one hand, she argues that disorder, lawlessness and the absence of 
law was at the heart of the colonial project itself; on the other she 
makes a case for law being the most reliable and consistent accomplice 
of violence. Both seem to be correct but they both point to two 
different historiographical trajectories (and there has been a lot of 
‘argumentative bloodshed’ between the two!): if lawlessness defined 
coloniality, then one can argue that the colonial state was weak, 
incompetent and/or even disinterested to inflict the ‘rule of law’. 
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Lawlessness and disorder flowed from the limitations and feebleness of 
the state in controlling the white fringe elements. However, if we have 
to argue that law wilfully helped perpetrate violence and shielded 
private whites because racial affinity overruled the ideological com-
mitment to equality, then we may be pursuing the exact opposite line 
of argument, that is, the colonial state was capable, committed and 
strong enough to wilfully discard its otherwise ideologically privileged 
stance of equality.  
We may finally turn towards drawing out a broader temporal picture 
in order to understand the changing relationship between violence and 
state-formation. What changed from the late eighteenth to the early 
twentieth century? Violence seems to have remained ubiquitous but 
laws kept on propping up. It seems that the period from the mid-
nineteenth century became crucial in certain ways: first, simply at the 
level of demography (there were more whites of all shades and classes 
in India). By the end of the nineteenth century, nearly half of the 
150,000 Europeans in India could have fallen under the category of 
“poor European” (Arnold 1979a: 455). Second, the legal and in-
stitutional mechanisms to control crime and to discipline and reform 
criminals (and other unruly groups) multiplied; third, there was a 
greater politicisation of certain issues related to this class, most no-
tably, the Eurasian Question; and fourth, the nationalist critique of 
colonialism emerged in this period, which made use of the gap 
between idealism and pragmatism of colonial law. 
Kolsky’s account makes a pertinent distinction between the reach of 
justice and severity of punishment at this temporal scale. According to 
her, in the late eighteenth century violent whites escaped justice 
because of the feebleness of the law but those who were convicted 
were meted out harsh punishment (incarceration, deportation and 
even execution). In contrast, hundred years later the European British 
subjects skilfully managed to secure their acquittals or significantly 
reduce their charges. The legal regime, in other words, was not feeble 
but lenient (Kolsky 2010: 189-90). Bailkin (2006: 463) makes the 
same point.  
The biggest collective achievement of this new body of scholarship is 
to force us to rethink imperial formation not just through its main-
stream ideologies and actors but through people on the margins and 
their actions. Secondly, it tells us that white violence was not a hidden 
script of the colonial literary and administrative archives; it was very 
much written about, and debated in the nineteenth and twentieth 
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centuries. The need therefore, as Bailkin eloquently puts it, is to 
“defamiliarise” ourselves with this violence to better understand its 
legal and social constructs (Bailkin 2006).  
                                                          
Endnotes 
1
 I call it ‘perverse’ because Edward Said’s Orientalism became the foundational text for 
postmodern ‘moods’ and colonial discourse analysis but he himself never became part of that 
school of history writing or cultural analysis. His take on post-colonialism can be gauged from his 
statement: “First of all, I don’t think colonialism is over, really. I don’t know what they [post-
colonialists] are really talking about.” (Said 1998: 82). 
2
 My use of the ‘dialogue framework’ therefore is sensitive to the power relations. It is the fear of 
this obliteration that prompts Sarkar to advise to better avoid the idea of a dialogue. (Sarkar 
2014: 23).  
3
 Nabob (derived from nawab, meaning ruler/master) was the pejorative term used in the British 
social and political culture for those who returned from India after amassing riches. The term 
almost meant someone who is morally debauched. In contrast, pucca sahib was one who was 
morally righteous and a non-corrupt administrator, someone who was an ideal blend of being a 
gentleman and an administrator.   
4
 See an insightful review by Amelia Bonea of Mizutani’s book, The Meaning of White: Race, 
Class, and the ‘Domiciled Community’ in British India 1858-1930, (review no. 1317) 
http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1317, [retrieved 16.12.2014].  
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